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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PATTIE S. CHRISTENSEN, : 
nka Pattie S. BRUBAKER 
Plaintiff and Appellant : 
v. : 
DANIEL R CHRISTENSEN, : 
Defendant and Appellee : 
: CASE NO. 960312-CA 
: PRIORITY 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final Order of the Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, Judge Hansen, entered on March 12, 1996, 
arising out of Petitions concerning custody/visitation, child 
support, and the name of the child, requiring the name change of 
the nine year old child of the parties, from the Plaintiff mother's 
new married name (used by the child for seven years) back to the 
Defendant father's name. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal by virtue of Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure; and Section 78-2a-3 (2) (i) [domestic relations cases], 
U.C.A. 1953, (as amended). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is it in the nine year old child* s best interest to cause 
her records to be changed after over seven years of being known as 
Brubaker? 
Alexander v. Alexander. 737 P.2d 221 (Utah 1987) 
Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985) 
Hirsch v. Hirsch. 725 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1986) 
Wall v. Wallr 700 P.2d 1124, 1125 (Utah 1985) 
Hamby v. Jacobson. 769 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989) 
Bobo v. Jewell. 528 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio 1988) 
2. Should the Defendant' s knowledge of the name change and 
lack of action for at least six years, act to estop him from 
requesting a change now? 
Hambv v. Jacobson. 769 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989) 
Pusey v. Pusey. 728 P.2d 117,119 (Utah 1986) 
Savage v. Savage. 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983) 
3. Did the trial court err in ordering the name to be changed 
back and child's records to be changed, where the Defendant had 
filed no Petition to Modify, and the only name-related issue before 
the court was the finalization of the Plaintiff's (five year 
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pending) formalization of the defacto (child7s own choice of) name 
change to Brubaker, not the issue of changing the name from 
Brubaker back to the Defendants name? 
Bountiful v. Riley. 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989) 
Smith v. Smith. 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
4. Did the trial court err in finding that the Defendant was 
current on his child support obligations, specifically by finding 
that the arrearages could be reduced by the application of the 
Plaintiff7s portion of the sale of joint/marital property? 
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
5. Did the trial court err in distinguishing the present case 
from Hamby v. Jacobson. 769 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989)? 
Hamby v. Jacobson. 769 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989) 
Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221 (Utah 1987). 
6. Did the trial court err in giving no or too little weight 
to the nine year old child* s historical (seven year) preference? 
Hamby v. Jacobson. 769 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989) 
Daves v. Nastos. 711 P.2d 314 (Wash. 1985). 
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7. Did the trial court make sufficient findings to support 
the conclusions and ordered relief? 
Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
Erwin v. Erwin. 773 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
Parvzek v. Parvzek. 776 P.2d 78 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
Shioii v. Shioii. 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and in particular: 
30-3-1 et seq 
42-1-1 et seq 
78-22-1 et seq 
Utah Court Rules (1991), as amended 
Fourth District Court Rules, as amended 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in particular: 
Rule 52 
Rule 43 
Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure (by collateral application, not 
under formal application), in particular: 
Rules 41, 43, 44 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, as amended 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, as amended, in particular 
Chapter 4, Article 9 
Chapter 6, Article 4 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as amended 
Colorado Statutes 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Fourth District Court, Provo 
Division, on 24 January, 1996, for trial, the Honorable Judge 
Steven L. Hansen, presiding. The case was before Judge Hansen on 
the Plaintiff s Petition to Modify as to support and other matters. 
After being notified of the proceedings, the Defendant filed an 
Order to Show Cause for visitation matters, and a count regarding 
the minor child' s use of the Plaintiff mother's surname of 
uBrubaker.n The Decree is silent as to the child's last name, and 
the Defendant filed no other pleadings. The Plaintiff had also 
filed an Order to Show Cause for support matters. 
On January 12, 1996, at the Order to Show Cause hearing, the 
Plaintiff s Petition to Modify was informally amended to include 
the finalization of the Plaintiff's prior action in another state 
to formalize the child's de facto name change to "Brubaker11. The 
name change issue was heard by Judge Hansen at the trial on January 
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24, 1996. The Judge ordered the child's records amended to reflect 
the name of "Christensen11. Plaintiff appeals the Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on January 16, 1987 in Springville, 
Utah, and their minor child, Stephanie, was born on July 20, 1987. 
However, the parties separated around January 1988, when the child 
was six months old. The child lived with the mother, who has had 
sole-custody, from that time forth. The parties' divorce was 
finalized on June 26, 1989. 
The Plaintiff (mother) married Joseph Brubaker on October 6, 
1989. The Plaintiff and her new husband had a son born to them: 
Chad Michael Brubaker, born on July 12, 1990. Since before the 
time of the birth of Chad, Stephanie has openly referred to herself 
as Stephanie Ann Brubaker, and has continued to do as such for over 
seven years. 
The Defendant has been aware of the defacto name change for at 
least six years. However, the Defendant has brought no action 
before the court to request that the child use the name 
Christensen, until the subject Order to Show Cause, raised at the 
eleventh hour when faced with the most recent of several awards for 
delinquent child support. Additionally, the Defendant had brought 
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no Petition to Modify before the court to request the Plaintiff to 
use the name of "Christensen" for the child. 
The child has been enrolled in school from Kindergarten 
through the fifth grade, under the name of Stephanie Ann Brubaker, 
with four of those grades being in public school. The child also 
has bank accounts, college savings plan, health insurance and 
church records, all in the name of "Brubaker". The child was 
baptized under the name of "Brubaker". The child is known 
throughout the community as "Brubaker". The child resides in 
Sandy, Utah, with her family: mother, father, and brother, all 
sharing the name of "Brubaker". The Defendant is a resident of 
Tacoma, Washington. The Defendant' s mother, sister, and half 
brother all have surnames other than Christensen. (The mother has 
been married four times). 
In 1991, the Plaintiff retained counsel and filed an action in 
Colorado (her resident state at the time) to have the minor child' s 
name legally changed to "Brubaker". The Defendant had had little 
contact with the child, and was unable to be located and served, so 
Notice was effected via publication in accordance with the 
applicable Colorado Statute. The Plaintiff left the matter in the 
hands of her counsel, and believed the name change to be final. 
However, the Plaintiff much later learned that due to an unforeseen 
death in the law office of the retained counsel, the Colorado 
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action, although unopposed by the Defendant, was never completed. 
The Defendant was in fact aware of the de facto name change, 
through his periodic association with and communication from the 
Plaintiff and the minor child. Further, the Defendant likely 
believed himself that the change was finalized in 1991 by the 
Colorado Court. The Defendant allowed the child to use the name of 
"Brubaker" for at least six years. 
The minor child has stated that she wishes to remain being 
known as Stephanie Ann Brubaker. 
At the time of the trial, the Defendant was delinquent on his 
child support obligations, and the Plaintiff held an as yet 
uncollected Judgment for $3000 in back child support. The funds 
from the sale of the Defendant's property had been held in escrow 
due to delinquencies in support, were not marital property. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is in the child' s best interests to remain being known as 
Stephanie Ann Brubaker. She has been known as such for over seven 
years and all of her records have been maintained in that fashion. 
The Defendant has known how the child refers to herself for over 
six years and has taken no formal action to stop it; whereas, the 
Plaintiff sought legal action to attempt to formalize the minor 
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child' s wishes. The fact that the Colorado action was never 
finalized, was not the fault of the Plaintiff. Further, the 
Defendant had already defaulted on the matter, and the finalization 
was, at that point, simply a ministerial action to be completed by 
the Court. 
The issue before this trial court was the Plaintiff's Petition 
to Modify to include recognition of the de facto name change begun 
and effectively defaulted by the Defendant in 1991, not the issue 
(which could have been plead by the Defendant) of forcing the child 
to go by a name that she does not want and has not used for over 
seven years. Most critical from a substantive point, is the fact 
that the court did not examine the child, and so could not have 
adequately considered the impact on the child, before ordering such 
a drastic change for her. 
The trial court made numerous errors in the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the Defendant 
was current on his child support obligations even though the 
Plaintiff had just been awarded, and had not yet received, $3000 in 
back child support. The trial court found that sales proceeds from 
the sale of the Defendant' s property, which had been held in escrow 
due to delinquencies, was marital property, when it was not. The 
trial court distinguished the present case from Hamby v. Jacobsonr 
769 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), instead relying on older cases from 
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other, non-Utah jurisdictions. The trial court gave no weight to 
the child' s preference even though the bulk of case law requires 
such a consideration. The trial court did not make sufficient 
findings to support the conclusions and ordered relief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS IN THE CHILD' S BEST INTERESTS 
TO MAINTAIN THE CHILD'S CHOICE FOR SEVEN YEARS 
AND TO ALLOW HER TO CONTINUE TO BE KNOWN AS 
STEPHANIE ANN BRUBAKER 
The paramount issue before this court is whether it is in the 
child' s best interests to allow a nine year old child to continue 
to be known by the name she has chosen and used for seven years: 
Stephanie Ann Brubaker. The best interest of the child must govern 
the determination whether or not to grant a change of name. Hamby 
v. Jacobsonf 769 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989); In re Omelson, 445 N.E.2d 
951 (111. Ct. App. 1983) M[T]he trial court [must] properly 
consider[] the best interest of the child rather than the father' s 
right as the primary consideration." King v. Newman, 421 S.W.2d 
149,151 (Tx. Ct. App. 1967). 
Hamby v. Jacobson lists six factors in determining the 
decision of whether to grant a name change. These are: 
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i. the child' s preference in light of the child' s age and 
experience; 
ii. the effect of a name change on the development and 
preservation of the child' s relationship with each parent [in this 
case, the consideration should include the relationship with the 
child and her step-parent and sibling, as well]; 
iii. the length of time a child has used a name; 
iv. the difficulties, harassment, or embarrassment a 
child may experience bearing the present or proposed name; 
v, the possibility that a different name may cause 
insecurity or lack of identity; 
vi. the motives or interests of the custodial parent. 
Additionally, the Hamby Court repeatedly referred to Nellis v. 
Pressman, 282 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1971). In Nellis, the court also 
listed the factors it used in determining when not to require the 
children to change their surnames back to their father' s. These 
factors were: 
a) the children had been known in the community for more 
than five years and had a good relationship with their father 
during those years, 
b) their name and identity have become imbedded in their 
minds, 
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c) the likely impact of changing their names back again 
after all these years, 
d) the need to seriously consider the children' s views 
because of their ages and level of intelligence, 
e) the father' s physical remoteness from the community 
where the child resides. 
The minor child in question in the case before this Court, 
Stephanie, was only six months old at the time of the Plaintiff 
(and the child's) separation from the Defendant. Transcript at 9, 
39. She has resided with her mother since that time, with her 
step-father Joseph Brubaker since October 1989, and with her 
brother since his birth in July 1990. Tr. 8. The child and her 
brother are extremely close. Tr. 99. Stephanie has used the name of 
"Brubaker" throughout her schooling - from kindergarten through 
fifth grade (nearly half of the required school attendance, and all 
of her schooling to date). Tr. 12. She has also used this name in 
all of her church activities, including her baptism. Tr. 12, 95. 
Her medical records are also in the name of "Brubaker". Tr. 98. 
Mr. Christensen, the Defendant, has neither seen nor requested to 
see the child's medical, educational, or religious records. Tr. 87. 
Mr. Christensen has had little contact with the child 
throughout the years. Tr. 40, 42. Mr. Christensen does not 
anticipate any major changes to the sporadic amount of interaction 
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and visitation with his daughter that he has historically 
exercised. Tr. 80. He is a resident of Tacoma, Washington. Tr. 38. 
Mr. Christensen has stated that, despite the sporadic visitation,m 
lack of involvement in her life, and de facto name change of seven 
years, his relationship with Stephanie, even during this time when 
she has been known as "Brubaker" has remained "good." Tr. 88. 
Stephanie has expressed the desire to continue to be known as 
Brubaker. Tr. 19. Mr. Christensen' s relatives, the child's 
paternal extended family in this state, have different last names 
than "Christensen". Tr. 87. Stephanie lives in Utah in the 
Brubaker household. Tr. 98. She refers to Mr. Brubaker as "Dad" . 
Despite her close relationship with her family, Stephanie has 
continued to refer to the Defendant by her pet name of " Sweetie 
Pie" (Tr. 44), further evidence that her choice of last name has 
not affected her relationship with Mr. Christensen. 
As Stephanie Brubaker has been known as such for over seven 
years and has used that name in all forms of record keeping, it is 
in her best interests not to force her to now use a different name. 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
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POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT' S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DE FACTO 
NAME CHANGE, AND LACK OF OBJECTION TO THE 1991 COLORADO 
ACTION, AND LACK OF OTHER OBJECTION FOR AT LEAST THE PAST 
SIX YEARS SHOULD ESTOP HIM FROM REQUESTING A CHANGE NOW. 
The Defendant, Mr. Christensen, has been aware of the name 
change for at least five or six years. Tr. 44. However, he has 
waited until now to bring any action about it. The Defendant is 
estopped by the equitable doctrine of laches, from now asking for 
the child's name to be restored to "Christensen11. 
uLaches is an equitable doctrine ' based on the maxim that 
equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.' * 
Almeida v. Almeida, 669 P.2d 174, 180 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983)(quoting 
Adair v. Hustace. 640 P.2d 294, 300 (Haw. 1982)). To successfully 
assert laches, one must establish that (1) one party unreasonably 
delayed in bringing an action, and (2) the other party was 
prejudiced by the delay. Breuer-Harrison. Inc v. Comber 799 P.2d 
757, 763 (Utah 1992). The Defendant has waited numerous years to 
bring this matter to the court. 
Further, and related to the long delay in the Defendant's 
objection, to the extent that the Defendant may be confused as to 
whether he defaulted on the 1991 Colorado action, he did in fact 
have opportunity to address it, and, despite the failure of the 
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Colorado Court to finalize the matter, the application of the 
doctrine of res judicata should be dispositive of the issue. 
In the meantime, the child in question has completed nearly 
half of her compulsory education under the name of "Brubaker". In 
addition, she has been baptized in the name of "Brubaker". She has 
established bank accounts, a college savings plan, health 
insurance, health records, personal records, and friendships in the 
name of "Brubaker". (See Point I). She resides in the "Brubaker" 
household in a completely separate state from the Defendant. 
The Defendant failed to act within a reasonable time to assert 
any potential legal rights. The child has taken numerous steps to 
choose and use her desired name. The child and her current family 
would be extremely prejudiced, and would suffer emotional 
difficulty, should the Court allow the child to be forced to change 
her name again — now that she has an established identity with the 
name. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE RECORDS 
TO BE CHANGED WHEN THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT WAS 
SIMPLY RECOGNIZING AND FINALIZING THE CHILD'S 
LONG TERM USE OF THE BRUBAKER NAME 
The issue before the trial court, as framed by the Plaintiff's 
Petition to Modify, was recognizing and finalizing the de facto 
name change to "Brubaker". Tr. 4-7. The child had already been 
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known by the name of Brubaker for more than six years before the 
trial. Thus, to further borrow from the Nellis case, 
tf[i]n our [the court's] view, the issue is not 
as the trial court viewed it — whether a name 
change to [the step-father1 s name] is required 
— because this is the name they have been 
carrying for more than five years, and this was 
without direct complaint by the father to the 
mother or children, and without meaningful action 
by him until the outset of the trial." 
Nellis, at 544. 
As in the Nellis case, a change after so many years would 
present grave problems and present pain and anguish 
specifically, but not limited to the matters of the child's 
personal sense of identity, sense of security, and family unity. 
Nellis at 540. 
The issue before the trial court was seeking a recognition or 
finalization of the Brubaker name, which the child has used for 
seven years. The trial court acted improperly in expanding it's 
findings and order to incorporate an issue (changing the records of 
the child) not plead by the Plaintiff, and not plead by way of 
Petition by the Defendant. 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT BASIS 
FOR REQUIRING THE CHANGE OF THE 
MINOR CHILD1 S RECORDS WITHOUT FIRST SPECIFICALLY 
EXAMINING THE CHILD AS TO HER FEELINGS 
ABOUT THE PROPOSED CHANGE. 
The uncontroverted evidence before the court is that the child 
wishes to be known by the name of Brubaker. Tr. 19. There was no 
evidence to the contrary. To change her name from that which she 
wishes to be known, especially without first inquiring of her as to 
her feelings, could not be in her best interest. In Azzara v. 
Waller, 495 So.2d 277, 279 (Fl. Ct. App. 1986), the Appeals Court 
stated, 
Furthermore, this court finds that it would 
be contrary to the best interest of [the child] 
for this court to do anything at this time that 
would in any way fetter [the child' s] freedom to 
use whichever surname with which she feels the 
most comfortable. 
Thus, especially when the child has herself made this choice, 
and resides with her family in Utah, hundreds of miles away from 
Mr. Christensen, she should be allowed the freedom to use the name 
of Brubaker without the court' s interference. Further, any decision 
to the contrary should follow a careful interview into the child's 
feelings and sensibilities. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING NO WEIGHT 
TO THE CHILD1 S PREFERENCE, AND IN RELYING ON 
INAPPLICABLE OR LESS APPLICABLE CASES TO THAT EFFECT, 
WHEN THERE HAVE BEEN UTAH CASES DECIDED BOTH BEFORE AND 
SINCE THAT TIME, SUPPORTING THE NAME CHANGE TO BRUBAKER 
The trial court cited to inapplicable or less applicable cases 
which conflicted with the Utah case law, and diminished the 
importance of a child's preference in choosing her name. The Hamby 
case is undisputed as the leading case, if not dispository case, in 
Utah on the matter of a child's last name. The cases of Mark v. 
Kahn. 131 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 1955) and Marshall v. Marshall. 93 
So.2d 822 (Miss. 1957) were both decided more than thirty years 
before Hamby. Application of Shipley, 205 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1960) was also decided nearly thirty years before Hamby. 
Ironically, although arguably inapplicable, In Re McCoy 287 N.E.2d 
833 (N.Y. 1972), cited by the trial court, allowed the name change. 
In contrast, years before the cases cited by the court were 
decided, Binford v. Reid, 63 S.E.2d 345 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951), held 
in a very similar situation that the child would be allowed to 
maintain the surname of the stepfather. In direct parallel with 
the case before this Court, the Georgia court cited 
i. the existence of siblings under the new name, 
ii. the fact that the stepfather's surname was used 
in school and at home, 
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iii. the young age of the child when the parties 
separated as reasons to support the court's decision. 
Also years earlier, in Bilenkin v. Bilenkin, 64 N.E.2d 84, 85-
86 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945), another case which parallels this case, 
the Ohio court stated, 
The trial judge points out that this practice 
of registering the minor daughter of the parties 
in the name of [the stepfather] had been followed 
from the time that the plaintiff had moved with 
her husband to their present residence. The home 
of the child is hundreds of miles removed from that 
of her father and it does not reasonably appear that 
he will be materially affected, one way or the other, 
by reason of the fact that his child there carries 
the name of [the stepfather]. 
In Johnson v. CogginsP 184 S.E. 2d 696 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971), in 
a case involving children of an age similar to the Plaintiff's 
child in this matter, the Georgia court granted name changes to the 
step-father's surname to an eight year old and a seven year old. 
The court found these youth to be old enough to decide the surname 
they wished to use. 
Also, on a more recent note, the issue of a minor child who 
wished to go by the surname of the step-father was addressed in 
then earlier cited Nellis case. In that case, the child 
...said he has a deep interest in retaining his 
name as it is while his name is of little tangible 
benefit and detriment to his father. He had 
lived as [the stepfather's surname] [for five] years 
that to revert now to the [father's] surname would 
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present grave problems for him and would cause him 
pain and anguish..." Id. at 540. 
...[a] child psychiatrist appearing for the 
appellant supported [the child7s] opinion that he 
would be harmed by returning to the name [of the 
father]. According to the expert testimony, [the 
child's] motives were so strong... because for 
five or six years ... [he] has grown up in the 
community as [the stepfather's surname." Id. at 540. 
The Nellis court noted that fl[i]t would have been better if 
the father had tackled the problem directly when he first became 
aware of the name changes." Id. at 541. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
DISTINGUISHING THE PRESENT CASE FROM 
HAMBY V. JACOBSON, 769 P.2D 272 (UTAH 1989). 
The controlling, if not wholly dispository, case in this 
jurisdiction regarding name changes of minors is HAMBY V. JACOBSONf 
769 P.2D 272 (UTAH 1989). In Hamby, the dispute involved a child 
which was unborn at the time of the separation. The dispute on 
appeal in this case, similarly involves a child who was born, but 
only shortly before the separation. In both case, despite the born 
vs unborn nature of the child in guestion, the child's own 
cognizance and identity remain the same. The analysis of 
determining the name change remains the same: the best interests of 
the child. Id at 277. 
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The factors that were determinative in the Hamby case are also 
present in the instant case. As in Hamby, there is no evidence 
present that allowing the child to remain "Brubaker" has or would 
weaken the relationship between her and the Defendant; nor that 
forcing Stephanie to go by the name of Christensen would strengthen 
the father-child relationship. If anything, in light of the 
child's expressed preference and long term use of "Brubaker", and 
her sense of identity established with that name, and her 
opposition to the name change (Tr. 19), such a change would likely 
weaken the relationship. Additionally, as in Hamby, causing the 
child to use a name other than the Brubaker name may divide family 
unity by having a child with a different surname from her brother, 
mother, and her "dad". The uncontroverted evidence before the 
court is that the child faces embarrassment and disruption from 
reverting to the name of "Christensen" at this stage in her 
schooling, and in her religious and social life. (Tr. 19). Akin to 
Hamby, Stephanie would benefit from having the same last name as 
her sibling, would share the same surname as one of her natural 
parents, would complete the family group, and would be more secure 
in her family life. 
Thus, the instant case is both legally and factually similar 
to the Hamby case and therefore should not have been distinguished. 
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The Hamby case controls in this jurisdiction, and directly applies 
to this set of facts. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT 
WAS CURRENT IN HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS 
AND THAT MARITAL PROPERTY WAS THE SOURCE OF PREVIOUS JUDGMENTS. 
The trial court made essential Findings of Fact which were 
clearly erroneous. First the trial court found that the Defendant 
is current on his child support obligations. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Docketing Statement Attachment N, Finding 31. 
This is clearly in error as the Plaintiff has brought and received 
Judgments (for as much as $10,000) for repeated actions for 
delinquent child support. Portions of the present trial were 
settled resulting in a judgment of $3000. The Defendant directly 
admitted to being delinquent on his support obligations. Tr. 51-54. 
Additionally, the trial court erroneously found that judgments 
had been satisfied by sums held in escrow from the sale of 
"marital" property. The court found in its Findings of Fact #32 
(Docketing Statement Attachment N) that the property through which 
a lien was effected was "marital" property. The uncontroverted 
evidence is that this property was never marital property. Rather, 
when Defendant attempted to sell the property, the equity was held 
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under escrow due to the delinquent child support Judgments. Tr. 36 
and Decree of Divorce. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS 
TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS AND ORDERED RELIEF 
The court found in its Findings of Fact #13 (Docketing 
Statement Attachment N) that the Plaintiff had moved more often 
than the Defendant. However, the trial court erred in the manner 
of "apples and oranges" when it compared the moves of the Plaintiff 
since separation with the moves of the Defendant since the Decree 
of Divorce. In actuality, if you compare the parties' moves for 
the same period of time, both parties have moved the same amount of 
times. 
The court found in its Findings of Fact #21 (Docketing 
Statement Attachment N) that the Defendant had not been reimbursed 
for travel expenses. However, this finding was not based on 
testimony or other competent evidence admitted at trial. 
Additionally, this Finding did not take into account the fact that 
the parties had (and still have) an agreement whereby travel 
expenses are netted against child support due. 
The court found in its Findings of Fact #28 (Docketing 
Statement Attachment N) that the Plaintiff did not make a 
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reasonable attempt to serve the Defendant during the 1991 Colorado 
matter, and that the Plaintiff should have attempted to serve the 
Defendant by service on the Defendant's Utah counsel. However, 
there was no evidence presented by the Defendant at trial that 
Colorado' s rules of civil procedure require or provide for the 
service on counsel as substitute or alternative service. 
Additionally, the uncontroverted testimony before the court is that 
said Utah counsel was extremely unreceptive to such duties. Tr. 24. 
The court found in its Findings of Fact #29 (Docketing 
Statement Attachment N) that the Plaintiff knew how to contact the 
Defendant through the Defendant' s family during his period of 
disappearance. However, there is nothing in the record to support 
this finding, nor is there any evidence that the Colorado rules 
allowed for or required this method of alternative service. 
The court found in its Findings of Fact #41 (Docketing 
Statement Attachment N) that many of the paternal relatives in Utah 
carry the Christensen surname. The record shows this to be clearly 
false. The Defendant' s mother carries the name of her fourth 
husband. The half-brother carries the name of the second husband. 
The sister carries the name of her own husband. Tr. 87. 
The court found in its Findings of Fact #42 (Docketing 
Statement Attachment N) that the child had been in home school 
throughout her schooling. However, the uncontroverted and totally 
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accurate information is that the child only attended home-school 
for second and third grades. Kindergarten, first, fourth, and 
fifth grades were in public school. In addition, her home school 
instruction was fully monitored, supervised, and recorded by a 
certified private school. Tr. 32. 
The court' s Conclusions of Law are based upon the foregoing 
inaccurate or incomplete Findings of Fact and are thus, unsupported 
and incorrect. In addition, the court based its Conclusions of Law 
on the erroneous premise of changing the surname from "Christensen" 
to "Brubaker", when the correct premise was allowing the minor 
child to continue to be known by the name of "Brubaker11. See 
Nellis. 
The trial court was under the legal misconception that the 
choice of a child of Stephanie1 s age was not to be given 
consideration, let alone weight. However, this is not true. A 
child as young as seven is old enough to determine the surname she 
wishes to use. See Johnson v. Coggins. 184 S.E. 2d 696 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1971). 
CONCLUSION 
It is in the child' s best interests to remain being known as 
Stephanie Ann Brubaker. She has been known as such for over seven 
years, and until very recently, without objection from the 
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Defendant. In contrast with the inactivity of the Defendant, the 
Plaintiff sought legal action to attempt to formalize the minor 
child's wishes, to which action, the Defendant defaulted in 1991. 
The fact that the Colorado action was never finalized, was not the 
fault of the Plaintiff. The doctrines of Res Judicata and 
Estoppel/Laches prevent the Defendant from seeking or receiving 
intervention at this late date. 
The issue before the trial court was the Plaintiff's Petition 
to Modify to include recognition of the de facto name change begun 
and effectively defaulted by the Defendant in 1991, not the issue 
(which could have been plead by the Defendant) of modifying the 
child's records and forcing the child to go by a name that she does 
not want and has not used for over seven years. 
It was error for the trial court, and runs contrary to the 
bulk of the applicable case law from Utah and sister jurisdictions, 
not to examine the child, and by doing so adequately investigate 
and considered the impact on the child, before ordering such a 
drastic change for her. 
The trial court erred in attempting to distinguish the present 
case from Hamby v. Jacobsonf 769 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), and by 
shoring up it's holding by relying on older cases from other, non-
Utah jurisdictions. 
The trial court made numerous errors in the Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law. The holding should be reversed as 
unsupported by the evidence, or in the alternative, remanded to the 
trial Court for further evidentiary inquiry and more complete and 
accurate Findings. 
The Plaintiff should recover her fees and costs incurred in 
this Appeal, to be proven by Affidavit of Counsel at the request of 
the Court. 
DATED this J' day of October, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM 
(SEE SEPARATELY BOUND ADDENDUM) 
